Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

State of Utah v. Richard Lyle Hobbs : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Happy J. Morgan; Counsel for Appellant.
Karen A. Klucznik; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; William L. Benge;
attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Hobbs, No. 20020146 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3711

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020146-CA
v.
RICHARD LYLE HOBBS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1999), IN
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, PRESIDING

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
HAPPY J. MORGAN
8 South 100 East
Moab, Utah 84532

WILLIAM L. BENGE
Grand County Attorney

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APFOXEftof Appeals

__

m 022002

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020146-CA
v.
RICHARD LYLE HOBBS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1999), IN
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, PRESIDING

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
HAPPY J. MORGAN
8 South 100 East
Moab, Utah 84532

WILLIAM L. BENGE
Grand County Attorney

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES,

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
STATING THAT A DEFENDANT'S GOOD FAITH BELIEF
THE VICTIM OWED HIM MONEY IS A COMPLETE
DEFENSE TO AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

7

A.

Preliminary point: clarification of the issue

8

B.

The trial court correctly rejected defendant's claim
that Hughes's common law claim-of-right defense to
robbery survived the 1973 amendments to the criminal
code

9

The statutory claim-of-right defense available for theft
does not apply to robbery

13

C.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE CONCERNING WHETHER THE
VICTIM HAD A PRACTICE OF UNDERPAYING HIS
EMPLOYEES AS IRRELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE
I

20

A.

Proceedings below

20

B.

The trial court properly ruled that evidence in support
of a non-existent defense is irrelevant and therefore not
admissible

23

Defendant waived any claim that the evidence was
admissible to show bias, motive, or credibility where he
affirmatively told the court that his defense was not based
thereon

24

THE TRIAL COURT'S TWO JURY INSTRUCTIONS
PROVIDING THE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND ROBBERY ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

25

C.

III

CONCLUSION

29

ADDENDUM A - Statutes

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Ashley v. State, 606 So. 2d 187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)

17

Austin v. State,21l N.W.2d668 (Wis. 1978)

18

Bartlett v. State, 765 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

17, 18

Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,993 P.2d 875

14,16

Boles v. State,!! S.W. 887 (Ark. 1893)

9

Commonwealth v. Davis, 66 S.W. 27 (Ky. App. 1902)

9

Commonwealth v. Slighter, 433 A.2d469 (Pa. 1981)

17

Commonwealth v. White, 19 A. 350 (Pa. 1890)

9

Crowderv. State, 527 S.E.2d901 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)

17

Fletcher v. State, 364 P.2d 713 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961)

17

Frazierv. State, 342 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961)

17

Houston v. Commonwealth, 12 S.E. 385 (Va. 1890)
Meedv. State, 41 N.W. 277 (Neb. 1889)

9
10

People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (Utah 1895)

4, 9

People v. Reid, 508N.E.2d661 (N.Y. 1987)

17, 18

People v. Tufunga, 987 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1999)

17

People v. Uselding, 247 N.E.2d 35 (111. Ct. App. 1969)

17

Simmons v. Smith,!5 So. 881 (Fla. 1899)

9

Smith v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
iii

17,18

State ex rel. A.B., 936?.2d 1091 (Utah App. 1997)
State ex. rel. L.P., 981 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1999)

14,16
14

State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997),
aff'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998)

1, 8, 27

State v. Amador, 804P.2d 1233 (Utah App. 1991)

17

State v. Barrick, 2002 UT App 120,46 P.3d 770

1

State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1996)

18,19

State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981)

28

State v. Donovan, J7 Utah 343,294 P. 1108

10

State v. Durant, 61A P.2d 638 (Utah 1983)
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983)

11,12,13
25

State v. Garcia, 2001 UTApp 19,18P.3d 1123

25

State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1983)

13

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404

24,26
23

State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7

2

State v. Larsen, 596 P.2d 1089 (Wash. 1979)

18

State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah App. 1994)

27

State v.Lucero, 866P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993)

25

State v. Martin, 516 P.2d 753 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)

17

State v. McMillen, 925 P.2d 1088 (Haw. 1996)
iv

17, 18

State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT79,34P.3d 187

3

State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 308 (N.J. 1995)

17,18

State v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000)

17,18

State v. Pass, 515 P.2d 612 (Utah 1973)

10

State v. Rechnitz, 52 P. 264 (Mont. 1898)

10

State v.Schaefer, 790P.2d281 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)

17

State v. Stewart, 925 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1996)

23

State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,17P.3d 1153
State v. Tuttle,730-?2d 630 (Utah 1986)

2
10,11

State v. Wasson, 101 N.W. 1125 (Iowa 1905)

9

State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46 (W.Va. 1982)

18

Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997)
Whitescarver v. State, 962 P.2d 192 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998)

13,14
17

STATE STATUTES
1973 Utah Laws 585, ch. 196

11, 13

1973 Utah Laws 586, ch. 196

10,13

1973 Utah Laws 615, ch. 196

11, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1999)

12

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to-307 (1999)

14,16

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-401 to-406 (1999)

14,16

v

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (1999)

14,16,19

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999)

passim

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999)

8,27

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1999)

15,16,19

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404(1999)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001)

1

Utah R. Evid. 402

23

Utah R. Evid. 403

24

Utah R. Evid. 404

24

Utah R. Evid. 406

20

Utah R. Evid. 608

24

vi

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020146-CA
v.
RICHARD LYLE HOBBS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court properly reject defendant's proposed jury
instructions stating that a defendant's good faith belief the victim owed
him money is a complete defense to aggravated robbery?
'"A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of law, which

[this Court] review[s] for correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court.'"
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). A trial court's
statutory interpretations are reviewed under the same standard. State v. Barrick, 2002 UT
App 120,14,46 P.3d 770.

II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence concerning
whether the victim had a practice of underpaying his employees as
irrelevant to defendant's aggravated robbery charge?
"[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is

relevant, and [this Court] will find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has
abused its discretion.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7 (citation omitted).
III.

Did the trial court's two jury instructions providing the statutory
definitions of aggravated robbery and robbery adequately instruct the
jury on the elements of aggravated robbery?
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a question of law, which this

Court reviews for correctness. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 11,17 P.3d 1153.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following pertinent statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 2, 2001, defendant was charged by information with aggravated burglary,
a first degree felony; aggravated robbery, a first degree felony; and aggravated assault, a
second-degree felony (R. 1-2). The aggravated burglary charge was dismissed at
defendant's preliminary hearing (R. 21-23; R. 177:5). Following a jury trial, defendant
was convicted of both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault (R. 160; R. 179:288).
The trial court then held that defendant's aggravated assault conviction merged into his
2

aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced defendant to five years to life in prison (R.
169-170, 171 -172). Defendant timely appealed (R. 174).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On June 29,2001, defendant entered his former employer's office wanting to
collect back wages he claimed he was owed (R. 178:91-92,93,94,106,107,188). When
the employer, Myke Hughes, began to dispute defendant's claim, defendant pulled a gun
on him, pointed it at his headfromabout fifteen feet away, and said, "things are over with
for you" (R. 178:94). Terrified, Hughes threw some papers into the air and ran out of the
building (R. 178:98). Defendant chased Hughes down the street, continuing to brandish
his gun, until police arrived (R. 178:112-13,130,137,166-67,174,177,179-80). He
then dropped his gun in some bushes and fled (R. 178:117,142,174,180). Three hours
later, defendant presented himself to the police, identified himself as John Doe, and said,
"Here I am, I did i f (R. 178:148). Defendant added, "Mike owes [me] $815 and when [I]
get[] out Mike will pay" (R. 178:148).
Defendant's defense. Prior to trial, defendant proffered a claim-of-right
defense—that he was "innocent of robbery, because his efforts to collect his wages were
legitimate, and not unlawful,... because he had no intent to take Hughes' property, but
only wanted to collect his own" (R. 129-130; see also R. 178: 60-61). In support of this

lr

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79,12, 34 P.3d 187.
3

defense, defendant sought to present evidence concerning Hughes's payroll practices to
show that defendant had "a bona fide belief that he had been shorted in his pay" (R.
178:62). He also sought various jury instructions stating that he could not be convicted of
aggravated robbery if he "had a good faith belief that he was entitled to the money sought,
even if... he was mistaken in this belief, and even if... [he] knew it was wrong to use
force to collect the debt or perceived debt" (R. 136,167).
After argument, the trial court concluded that People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39
P. 492 (Utah 1895), a case recognizing a common law claim-of-right defense to robbery,
had been superceded by the 1973 criminal code (R. 178:67,161-62). It then concluded
that the criminal code did not provide a claim-of-right defense to robbery (R. 178:16162). Thus, the court excluded any evidence of the victim's payroll practices as irrelevant
and rejected defendant's proposed jury instructions (R. 178:67-68,160-62,163).
At the beginning of trial, the jury was instructed that "being owned money by
someone does not mean that you have the right just on your own without any legal
process to come in and take whatever money there may be at the place of business" (R.
178:71). Thus, although "you'll hear evidence of what was said because that forms a part
of understanding what motive [defendant] may have had for doing what he may have
done,... it is not for you to decide whether he was owed money" (R. 178:71-72).
At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that defendant was guilty of
aggravated robbery if "defendant, while in the course of committing robbery . . . [d]id use

4

a dangerous weapon . . . [k]nowingly and intentionally" (R. 142; Jury Instr. 3). It was
then instructed that "[r]obbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking
of personal property from another,fromhis person or in his immediate presence, by
means of force or fear" (R. 143; Jury Instr. 4). Finally, the jury was instructed that "I can
not assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe that the other person owes me
money" (R. 143; Jury Instr. 4).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury that a
person who acts under a bona fide belief that he is owed money cannot be convicted of
aggravated robbery even if his belief is mistaken and even if he knows it is wrong to use
force to collect a debt. However, defendant's claim rests on a common law claim-of-right
defense that was abolished upon re-enactment of the criminal code in 1973. Because
nothing in the current code recognizes such a defense to robbery, defendant's claim fails.
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded evidence
concerning the victim's business practices because that evidence was relevant to support
his claim-of-right defense and to establish the victim's motive and bias in accusing him of
aggravated robbery. Because no claim-of-right defense exists in Utah, the trial court
properly determined the evidence was irrelevant and thus inadmissible for that purpose.
Because defendant never sought admission of the evidence to establish motive and bias,

5

and indeed rejected the trial court's suggestion that he might, defendant waived this part
of his claim below.
Issue III. Defendant claims the trial court's aggravated robbery instruction was
erroneous "because it did not contain the elements of robbery, but simply inserted the
word robbery into the general aggravated robbery elements instruction/' However, this
Court will not find error in a trial court's jury instructions if the instructions as a whole
adequately inform the jury of the law upon which the case must be decided. In this case,
the court set out the statutory elements of aggravated robbery in Jury Instruction 3. Jury
Instruction 4 then defined the statutory elements of robbery. Because these instructions
together adequately informed the jury of the applicable law, no error occurred.
Defendant also claims the trial court's robbery instruction was erroneous. He
claims first that it was erroneous because "it omitted the element that the taking was
intentionally and knowingly unlawful." Because proof that "the taking was intentionally
and knowingly unlawful" is not an element of robbery, this part of defendant's claim
fails. Defendant has norightto jury instructions that misstate the law.
Defendant claims second that the robbery instruction was erroneous because it
"added the nonexistent element that there was no good faith defense to a charge of
robbery." However, "discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate
conclusions from the testimony depend[s] on discharge of the judge's responsibility to
give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria."

6

Here, defendant argued in closing that he should be acquitted of aggravated robbery
because "he just want[ed] to get paid" and "he made some bad choices [with] a gun."
Based on this argument, the trial court properly reminded the jury that "I can not [sic]
assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe that the other person owes me
money."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS STATING THAT A
DEFENDANT'S GOOD FAITH BELIEF THE VICTIM OWED HIM
MONEY IS A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY
Defendant claims the trial court erred in not giving his proposed jury instruction

that "if you find that [defendant] had a good faith belief that he was entitled to the money
sought, even if you find that he was mistaken in this belief, and even if you find that [he]
knew it was wrong to use force to collect the debt or perceived debt, you must acquit
[him] of the aggravated robbery charge." Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing R. 136); Aplt. Br. at 1921. First, defendant argues that the term "unlawfully" in the robbery statute requires
proof that he acted "with felonious intent" as that term was defined at common law,
thereby incorporating his common law claim-of-right defense. Aplt. Br. at 19-21.
Second, he argues that the claim-of-right defense provided by statute to theft also applies
to robbery. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Neither of defendant's arguments withstands scrutiny.
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A criminal defendant has the right to have his '"theory of the case presented to the
jury in a clear and understandable way.'" State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App.
1997) (quoting State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981)), ajf'd, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah
1998). However, he is "not entitled to an instruction that 'does not accurately state the
applicable law.'" Id. (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991)).
A.

Preliminary point: clarification of the issue.

Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery based on his use or threatened use
of a dangerous weapon "in the course of committing robbery" (R. 142; Jury Instr. 3). See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(a) (1999). Under section 76-6-301, a person may commit
robbery in two different ways, if:
(a)

(b)

the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to
take personal property in the possession of anotherfromhis
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of
force or fear; or
the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of committing a
theft.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999). Here, however, the jury was not instructed on the
definition of robbery contained in subsection (b). Rather, the jury was instructed only on
the definition contained in subsection (a) (R. 143; Jury Instr. 4). Thus, the only issue
properly before this Court is whether a claim-of-right defense exists to robbery charged
under section 76-6-301 (l)(a). This Court need not decide whether a claim-of-right
defense exists to robbery charged under section 76-6-301 (l)(b).

8

B.

The trial court correctly rejected defendant's claim that
Hughes's common law claim-of-right defense to robbery
survived the 1973 amendments to the criminal code.

Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court erred in ruling that the adoption of the Utah
Code superceded Hughes in the context of robbery, because the robbery statute continues
to require proof of... an unlawful... taking of personal property in the possession of
another," and thus "the government is still required to prove animus furandir Aplt. Br. at
19-20,21. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
In 1895, the supreme court of the territory of Utah decided People v. Hughes, 11
Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895), the only Utah case ever to recognize a claim-of-right defense
to robbery. Hughes held that the defendant, who had used a gun to take money lost in an
allegedly corrupt card game, could not be convicted of robbery because, "'[w]hen [a
person] takes the property under a bonafide impression that the property belongs to him,
he commits no robbery, for there is no animus furandi.'" Id. at 494 (quoting State v.
McCune, 70 Am. Dec. 188).
At the time, however, robbery was defined under common law as "the felonious
and forcible taking,fromthe person of another, of goods or money to any value, by
violence, and putting him in fear." Commonwealth v. White, 19 A. 350, 350 (Pa. 1890);
see also Boles v. State, 22 S.W. 887, 887 (Ark. 1893); Simmons v. Smith, 25 So. 881, 882
(Fla. \m);Statev.

Wasson, 101 N.W. 1125,1126(Iowa 1905); Commonwealth v.

Davis, 66 S.W. 27,27 (Ky. App. 1902); Houston v. Commonwealth, 12 S.E. 385, 386-87

9

(Va. 1890). Under this definition, the taker only had the requisite felonious intent, or
animus furandi, if he knew 'that the property was not his own; that it belonged to another;
that he had no legal right to take it." Meed v. State, 41 N.W. 277,278 (Neb. 1889); see
also State v. Rechnitz, 52 P. 264,265 (Mont. 1898).
Until 1973, the definition of robbery in Utah was essentially identical to the
definition at common law. See State v. Pass, 515 P.2d 612,613 n.l (Utah 1973) (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1 as defining robbery to be "the felonious taking of personal
property in the possession of another,fromhis person, or immediate presence, and against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear"); State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294 P.
1108,1109 (Utah 1931) (same). Arguably, then, the claim-of-right defense available
under Hughes was also available under these statutes.
However, "[i]n an effort to rationalize, clarify, and improve upon the frequently
archaic common law definitions of crimes, the legislature in 1973 repealed wholesale all
the prior substantive criminal statutes (including, necessarily, defenses) and enacted a
sweeping new penal code that departed sharplyfromthe old common law concepts."
State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 632 (Utah 1986).
As part of this process, the legislature explicitly abolished all common law crimes.
See 1973 Utah Laws 586, ch. 196, § 76-1-105 (providing that "[c]ommon law crimes are
abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute
or municipal ordinance"). It also, almost as explicitly, abolished all common law

10

defenses. See 1973 Utah Laws 585, ch. 196, § 76-1-103 (providing "[t]he provisions of
this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any
offense defined in this code") (emphasis added).
Finally, the legislature amended the robbery statute to replace the common law
term "felonious taking" with the requirement only that the taking be done "unlawfully and
intentionally." 1973 Utah Laws 615, ch. 196, § 76-6-301.
Despite the clear intent of these amendments to divorce the criminal code from
common law, cf Tuttle, 730 P.2d at 632, defendant nonetheless claims that the term
"unlawfully" within the robbery statute has the same meaning as did the term "with
felonious intent" at common law, and thus, includes a claim-of-right defense. He fails,
however, to cite the one case most on point, State v. Durant, 61A P.2d 638 (Utah 1983),
which defeats his claim.
In Durante the supreme court rejected the view that the word "unlawfully" within
the current aggravated arson statute incorporated the common law defense that a person
did not commit arson if he burned his own property.
Prior to 1973, the aggravated arson statute required that a person act "maliciously"
before he could be convicted of arson. Durante 61A P.2d at 642 n.l. Under the common
law, "maliciously" required "that 'the burning be done to injure another... or the
property of another.'" Id. (citation omitted). Thus, one who burned his own property
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without attempting to injure another was not guilty of arson. Durant, 61A P.2d at 639; Id.
at 647-50 (Stewart, J. Joined by Hall, C.J., dissenting).
In 1973, however, the legislature amended the aggravated arson statute to remove
the term "maliciously" and replace it with "unlawfully." Id. at 642 n. 1.
Despite the 1973 amendment, Durant claimed that he was not guilty of aggravated
arson because the owner of the home he had burned had given him permission to burn it.
Id. at 639. In support of his claim, Durant "pointfed] to the word 'unlawfully' in the
statute" and argued that that term encompassed his ownership defense. Id. at 640. "The
defendant's only justification for this construction [was] that it preserves the common law
concept of arson." Id.
The supreme court rejected Durant's claim. Noting both the legislature's recent
abolition of the common law and its simultaneous removal of the common law term,
"maliciously,"fromthe aggravated arson statute, the court refused to "contriv[e] a
definition of 'unlawfully' in order to superimpose common law notions on the plain
words of the statute." Id. at 641, 642 n. 1. Rather, the court interpreted the term
"unlawfully" to mean "without justification, license or privilege," and then turned to
codified law to determine whether such justification, license or privilege existed. Id. at
641; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1999) (providing "provisions of this code shall
govern the construction o f . . . defenses against any offense defined in this code); State v.
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Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1983) (holding only defenses available are those
specified by statute). It found that none did. Durant, 61A P.2d at 642.
Durant is directly applicable here. In 1973, the legislature removed the common
law term "felonious taking" from the robbery statute. It simultaneously abolished all
common law crimes and instructed that the code would be the source of all defenses. See
1973 Utah Laws 585, 586, 615. In light of these amendments, defendant's attempt to
"contriv[e] a definition of 'unlawfully9 in order to superimpose common law notions on
the plain words of the statute" fails. Durant, 674 P.2d at (AY, 642 n.l.
Consequently, the trial court properly rejected defendant's claim.
C.

The statutory claim-of-right defense available for theft does not
apply to robbery.

Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his
proposed jury instructions because the claim-of-right defense provided by statute to theft
applies to robbery. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Defendant's claim fails as a matter of statutory
construction.
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, [this Court] look[s] first to
the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520
(Utah 1997) (citation omitted). Statutory terms are interpreted "'according to their
commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary meaning of the term results in an
application that is either unreasonably confused, inoperable,... or in blatant
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contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" State ex. rel L.P., 981 P.2d 848, 850
(Utah App. 1999) (citations omitted).
In addition, this Court "assume[s] that each term in the statute was used
advisedly," Stephens, 935 P.2d at 520 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and
"that the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another," Biddle v.
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, f 14,993 P.2d 875. 'Therefore, omissions in
statutory language should 'be taken note of and given effect.'" Id. (quoting Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217,219 (1973)).
Finally, this Court "read[s] a statute to harmonize it with related statutes." State ex
rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091,1097 (Utah App. 1997).
1.

Relevant statutes.

Title 76 , Chapter 2, Parts 3 and 4 of the Utah Code set forth general defenses to
and justifications excluding criminal responsibility. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to 307; 76-2-401 to -406 (1999). Neither part provides a general claim-of-right defense.
Title 76, Chapter 6 is entitled "Offenses against Property." Section 76-6-101 sets
out provisions generally applicable to the chapter. Id. § 76-6-101 (1999). Section 76-6101(3) provides that, "[f]or purposes of this chapter[,].. .'[property' is that of another, if
anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any portion
thereof." Id. Nothing in this section provides a general claim-of-right defense to offenses
against property.
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Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3 is entitled "Robbery." Section 76-6-301(a), under
which defendant was convicted, provides that a person commits robbery if he "unlawfully
and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear." Id.
§ 76-6-301(b) (1999). Nothing in this part provides a claim-of-right defense to robbery.
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4 is entitled "Theft." Section 76-6-404 provides that "[a]
person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Id.. § 76-6-404 (1999). Section 76-4-402
provides:
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1)
Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the
property.
(2)
It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in
the property or service stolen if another person also has an
interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe
(3)
It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a)
Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or
service involved; or
(b)
Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to
obtain or exercise control over the property or service
as he did; or
(c)
Obtained or exercised control over the property or
service honestly believing that the owner, if present,
would have consented.
A/. § 76-6-402 (1999).
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2.

Analysis

Section 76-6-402(3)(a), by its plain terms, applies only to charges brought under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3)(a) (providing that "[i]t is a
defense under this part that the actor... [a]cted under an honest claim ofrightto the
property or service involved."). Robbery is not included within Title 76, Chapter 6, Part
4. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (defining robbery). Thus, under the plain language of
section 76-6-402(3)(a), the claim-of-right defense provided therein does not apply to
robbery.
Moreover, section 76-6-402(3)(a) indicates that "the Utah Legislature clearly knew
how to make" a claim-of-right defense available when it wanted to. State ex rel A.B.,
936 P.2d at 1098. Yet, no such defense appears within those parts of the code addressing
generally applicable defenses and justifications. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to 307, 76-2-401 to -406. Nor does such a defense appear within that section of the code
addressing those provisions generally applicable to crimes against property. See id. § 766-101. Nor does such a defense appear within that part of the code specifically
addressing robbery. See id. § 76-6-301 to -302. Such omission, which must "'be taken
notice of and given effect/" Biddle, 1999 UT 110, at J 14 (citation omitted), indicates the
legislature's intent not to provide a claim-of-right defense to robbery. Cf. State ex rel
A.B., 936 P.2d at 1098 (giving force to legislature's failure to include rehabilitation as
factor for consideration under serious youth offender act where legislature's inclusion of
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rehabilitation as factor under other statutes indicated legislature knew how to include
such factor when it wanted); State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233,1235 (Utah App. 1991)
(Orme, J., concurring in result) (discussing statute defining when state may appeal in
criminal cases).
Finally, public policy supports the legislature's decision. A claim-of-right defense
to robbery, which "encourag[es] people to take the law into their own hands or to use
violence or self-help," State v. Schaefer, 790 P.2d 281,283 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), is
'""not only... lacking in sound reason and logic, but... utterly incompatible with and
ha[s] no place in an ordered and orderly society such as ours,'"" State v. McMillen, 925
P.2d 1088,1090-91 (Haw. 1996) (quoting People v. Hodges, 496 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74
(App. Div. 1985) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 305 A.2d 800, 802 (N.J. App. Div. 1973)); see
also State v. Martin, 516 P.2d 753, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).2

2

In fact, despite defendant's contention otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 19 (citing
outdated edition of Lafave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law), since at least the early
1960's, the clear modern trend has been to reject a claim-of-right defense to robbery,
especially where the claim relates to debt collection. See, e.g., Ashley v. State, 606 So.2d
187, 190 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (no defense); Whitescarver v. State, 962 P.2d 192, 195
(Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Schaefer, 790 P.2d at 284; Bartlett v. State, 765 So. 2d 799, 801
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); McMillen, 925 P.2d at 1091; State v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782,
787 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); Smith v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 266,268 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 308, 316-320 (N.J. 1995); Fletcher v. State, 364 P.2d
713, 721 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 433 A.2d 469,471 (Pa.
1981); see also People v. Uselding, 247 N.E.2d 35, 37 (111. Ct. App. 1969) (no defense to
debt collection); People v. Reid, 508 N.E.2d 661, 662, 664 (N.Y. 1987); Martin, 516 P.2d
at 756; Frazier v. State, 342 S.W.2d 115,116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961); see also People v.
Tufunga, 987 P.2d 168,174-75 (Cal. 1999) (no defense to debt collection unless involves
specific property owed); Crowder v. State, 527 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000);
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Defendant claims, however, that "[e]ven if the legislature's intent to permit a good
faith defense to robbery were questionable, the court recently recognized . . . in
distinguishing [the] offenses of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, t h a t . . .
"aggravated robbery always requires proof that the defendant took another's property "'
Aplt. Br. at 21 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1996)) (emphasis in
defendant's brief). Moreover, he continues, "[t]he idea that § 76-6-402 applies strictly to
theft offenses is . . . refuted by the fact that in interpreting the [statute], the Utah Supreme
Court has not limited its application to theft charges, but has found the portion of the
statute containing the presumption about possession of recently stolen property applicable
to other crimes." Aplt. Br. at 21 (citing State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978)).
Neither Brooks nor Sessions help defendant.
First, defendant appears to assumes that Brooks's statement that "aggravated
robbery always requires proof that the defendant took another's property," see Brooks,
908 P.2d at 862, necessarily means that the State must prove the other person actually
owned the property taken. However, such an interpretation of Brooks ignores section 766-101(3), which provides that, "[f)or purposes of this chapter[,]... *[p]roperty' is that of

State v. Larsen, 596 P.2d 1089,1090 (Wash. 1979); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46, 51
(W.Va. 1982); Austin v. State, 271 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Wis. 1978).
This is so even where a claim-of-right defense to theft exists. See Reid, 508
N.E.2d at 662, 664 (holding statutory claim-of-right defense to larceny does not apply to
robbery; concluding "that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would
have said so."); Bartlett, 765 So. 2d at 801; McMillen, 925 P.2d at 1091; Miller, 622
N.W.2d at 797; Smith, 587 S.W.2d at 268; Mejia, 662 A.2d at 316-20.
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another, if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any
portion thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(3). Under this definition, then, "proof that
the defendant took another's property," see Brooks, 908 P.2d at 862, may be established
either by proof that the other actually owned the property taken or by proof that he merely
possessed it. Thus, nothing in Brooks requires recognition of a claim-of-right defense.
Finally, even assuming arguendo, as defendant contends, that Sessions requires
application of section 76-6-402's theft defenses to robbery, section 76-6-402(2) within the
same statute renders such application a nullity. Section 76-6-402(3)(a) provides that "[i]t
is a defense [to theft] that the actor... [a]cted under an honest claim of right to the
property or service involved." Id. § 76-6-402(3)(a). However, section 76-6-402(2)
provides that "[i]t is no defense [to theft] that the actor has an interest in the property or
service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to
infringe." Id. § 76-6-402(2). As discussed above, another person has such an interest if
he "has a possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof." Id. § 76-6-101(3).
Here, it is undisputed that the victim had a possessory interest in the property defendant
sought. Thus, even if Sessions requires application of section 76-6-402 to crimes other
than theft, section 76-6-402(2) of that statute defeats any possible claim-of-right defense
under section 76-6-402(3)(a).
For all of the above reasons, defendant's reliance of the claim-of-right defense to
theft fails. Thus, the trial court properly rejected defendant's claim-of-right instructions.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE CONCERNING WHETHER THE
VICTIM HAD A PRACTICE OF UNDERPAYING HIS
EMPLOYEES AS IRRELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding

evidence concerning the victim's allegedly dishonest business practices. Aplt. Br. at 22.
According to defendant, "[t]he trial court should have permitted him not only to present
the evidence of wages owed to [him] to support his good faith defense/' but also should
have permitted him to present evidence "of Hughes' history of extremely dishonest and
unlawful business dealings with his employees [which] bore directly on his motive in
accusing Hobbs of robbery in the midst of a pay dispute." Aplt. Br. at 23,25.
Because no "good faith defense" to robbery exists, the trial court did not err in
excluding the evidence on that basis. To the extent defendant claims the evidence was
admissible as relevant to the victim's motive and credibility, defendant affirmatively
waived this claim below when he rejected the trial court's offer to consider the evidence
on this basis.
A.

Proceedings below.

Before trial, defendant requested a ruling on the admissibility of the victim's
business practices under rule 406, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 178:60). Defendant
claimed the victim's "payment practice is relevant" to the robbery charge because of his
defense that he had "a bona fide belief that he had been shorted in his pay" (R. 178:62-
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63). After concluding that Utah did not recognize a claim-of-right defense to robbery, the
court ruled that the evidence defendant sought was irrelevant and, thus, not admissible (R.
178:68).
After the State's sixth witness, defendant re-iterated his objection to the trial
court's exclusion of evidence concerning the victim's business practices. Defendant
stated: "I think limiting the evidence he can put on in terms of what was going on, what
were his thoughts and beliefs that would go to his (inaudible) and mental state, I think it's
a violation of his rights that he can't put on what he believes to be his theory of the case."
(R. 178:159). The trial court reaffirmed its ruling (R. 178:160-62).
After defendant testified, defendant again raised the issue of the victim's business
practices. This time, however, defendant claimed the evidence was relevant not only to
support a good faith defense but because "it also goes to credibility" since "[s]omebody
who is consistently not paying consistent with the hours that their employee works . . .
lends itself to somebody who is credible or to credible, truthful or not truthful, and it's a
form of cheating" (R. 178:214-15). The trial court ruled that "you can't bring it in for
that purpose. The rules are very clear. We don't get to create mini trials within trials . . .
because they have to do with credibility

The only way you get in credibility

testimony is in opinion or reputation form" (R. 178:215). Defendant raised no objection,
but rather indicated, "I understand" (R. 178:215).
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The trial court then noted, however, that if defendant's defense was "that this
whole thing was a setup by Mr. Hughes and that what happened is Mr. Hughes had been
cheating him and then in order to avoid paying him set him up for a robbery charge,...
then maybe you can get in to all of that, but it commits you to a pretty, quote 'fantastic,'
unquote, defense" (R. 216). "But you [defense counsel] have never told me that that's a
defense you're running here" (R. 178:216). "So I would suggest that you decide with
[defendant] whether that's what you want to run and if you do then I'll talk about whether
we can get into the billing practices" (R. 178:216).
After consulting with defendant, defense counsel explained that the court's prior
summation of defendant's defense "is inconsistent with what it is" (R. 178:221). In fact,
the picture [defendant] wanted to paint was this is a business that
consistently mismanages funds, doesn't pay employees correctly, has
problems as a result of that with the Internal Revenue Service or
other disputes, employees complaining about missing wages, and
that when he stood in that office that day and threatened a lawsuit,
some of Mr. Hughes' reaction to that was overreaction based on his
[being] upset about the situation in general and about his threats of
suing him . . . .
. . . The connection would be that when [defendant] was
standing in the [victim's] office . . . arguing with him about the
payroll situation and threatening to sue him and threatening to
contact the Internal Revenue Service or whomever, that that was
already a sensitive subject, that that pushed somebody who was
already involved in ongoing disputes by employees . . . , over the
edge. That he was somebody who was very sensitive to that
complaint because he had heard it quite a bit and that that's partial
basis for his overreaction that day.
(R. 178:222-24).
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After hearing defendant's explanation, the court ruled that the business practice
evidence was not admissible. The court explained that, although the evidence
may all tend to show a special sensitivity on Mr. Hughes' part,... it
does so at the cost of a considerable amount of time, introducing the
potential for confusion of the issues, delay, and... some possible
prejudice, I guess, to Mr. Hughes
I just think that if it has any
relevance it's not sufficient to justify the risk of confusion, unfair
prejudice to Mr. Hughes, and the time that we'd consume in doing it.
(R. 178:226).
B.

The trial court properly ruled that evidence in support of a nonexistent defense is irrelevant and therefore not admissible.

Defendant claims that the trial court "should have permitted him . . . to present the
evidence of wages owed to [him] to support his good faith defense." Aplt. Br. at 23.
However, as discussed in Point I, supra at pp. 7-19, Utah does not recognize a good faith
claim-of-right defense to robbery. Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that evidence
in support of that defense was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. See Utah R. Evid.
402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,
^| 13, 973 P.2d 404 ("[WJhere the proffered evidence has no probative value to a fact at
issue, it is irrelevant and is inadmissible under rule 402."); State v. Stewart, 925 P.2d 598,
600-01 (Utah App. 1996).
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C.

Defendant waived any claim that the evidence was admissible to
show bias, motive, or credibility where he affirmatively told the
court that his defense was not based thereon.

Defendant claims that the trial court should have permitted him to present
"evidence of Hughes' history of extremely dishonest and unlawful business dealings with
his employees" because it "bore directly on his motive in accusing [defendant] of robbery
in the midst of a pay dispute" and would have "expos[ed] Hughes' bias in accusing
[defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 23,25. Defendant claims the evidence was admissible under
rules 404, 608(c), and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 23-26.
However, defendant never sought admission of the challenged evidence on this
basis. At no point below did defendant ever mention motive or bias as a basis for
admitting the evidence, nor did he ever argue that the evidence was admissible for that
purpose under rules 404,608(c) or 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Thus, defendant
waived this claim below. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11,10 P.3d 346 ("As a general
rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.").
Moreover, when the trial court told defendant that it would consider admitting the
evidence if defendant's defense was "that this whole thing was a setup by Mr. Hughes
and that what happened is Mr. Hughes had been cheating him and then in order to avoid
paying him set him up for a robbery charge," defendant specifically stated, after
consultation with counsel, that the defense suggested by the court "is inconsistent with
[what defendant's defense] is" (R. 178:216, 221, 223-24). Yet, this is the very defense
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defendant now raises on appeal. This court will not consider claim on appeal if defendant
"led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d, 1201,1220 (Utah
1983).
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S TWO JURY INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDING
THE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
AND ROBBERY ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's aggravated robbery instruction was

incorrect, because it did not contain the elements of robbery, but simply inserted the word
robbery into the general aggravated robbery elements instruction/' Aplt. Br. at 35.
Defendant further claims that the trial court gave an "inaccurate robbery definition
instruction, which omitted the element that the taking was intentionally and knowingly
unlawful, and which added the nonexistent element that there was no good faith defense
to a charge of robbery." Aplt. Br. at 35. Defendant's claims are frivolous.
Jury instructions "must accurately and adequately inform a criminal jury as to the
basic elements of the crime charged." State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1993).
However, "[j]ury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to determine their adequacy."
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 13, 18 P.3d 1123. Thus, '"[tjhis court will affirm
when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the case to the jury [even where] one
or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have
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been.9" Id. (quoting State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295, H 9, 13 P.3d 1060 (further
citation omitted)) (brackets in original).
Here, jury instruction 3 provided:
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements
are as follows:

1.
2.
3.

COUNT I: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
That on or about June 29,2001, defendant, while in the
course of committing robbery,
Did use a dangerous weapon,
Knowingly and intentionally.

(R. 142;JuryInstr.3).
Jury instruction 4 then provided:
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted
taking of personal propertyfromanother, from his person or in his
immediate presence, by means offeree or fear.
Personal property means anything of value other than land. I
can not [sic] assert as a defense to a charge of robbery that I believe
that the other person owes me money.
(R. 143: Jurylnstr. 4).
Defendant contends first that Jury Instruction 3 was inadequate because "it did not
contain the elements of robbery, but simply inserted the word robbery into the general
aggravated robbery elements instruction/' Aplt. Br. at 35. However, defendant did not
object to Jury Instruction 3 on this basis below (R. 179:243-53). Thus, this claim is
waived. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.")- I n any case, where Jury
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Instruction 3 mirrored the language of the aggravated robbery statute, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302, and the very next instruction explained the elements of robbery, defendant's
claim fails. State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396-97 (Utah App. 1994) (finding no error
where one jury instruction "mirrored the language of the theft statute" and "the other jury
instructions adequately instructed the jury" on the meaning of "intent to deprive" within
that instruction)).
Defendant next contends that Jury Instruction 4 was inadequate because it "omitted
the element that the taking was intentionally and knowingly unlawful" and "added the
nonexistent element that there was no good faith defense to a charge of robbery." Aplt.
Br. at 35.
Concerning defendant's first contention, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (l)(a)
provides person commits robbery if "the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or
attempts to take personal property in the possession of anotherfromhis person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear." Nothing in the statute
requires that the person intend or know that his taking is unlawful. Thus, the trial court
did not err in not including that language in its robbery instruction. See State v. Alonzo,
932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) (holding defendant is "not entitled to an instruction
that 'does not accurately state the applicable law'") (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 799 (Utah 1991)).
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Concerning defendant's second contention, the trial court did not add any
"nonexistent element" to robbery in Jury Instruction 4. Rather, it merely re-iterated a
preliminary instruction given earlier that "being owed money by someone does not mean
that you have the right just on your own without any legal process to come in and take
whatever money there may be at the place of business" (R. 178:71). As discussed supra
at pp. 7-19, this is a correct statement of the law. Moreover, the trial court appropriately
instructed the jury on this issue where defendant's aggravated robbery charge was based
on his use of force during an attempt to collect wages allegedly owed, and defendant
argued in closing that the jury should acquit him of aggravated robbery because "he's not
going there to rob anybody, he's not going there with the intention of harming anybody,
he just wants to get paid" (R. 179:278) and "he made some bad choices

He had a

gun, they were fighting" (R. 179:279). See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1981)
("'Discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate conclusions from the
testimony depend[s] on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the
required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria.'" (citation omitted)).
Consequently, defendant's jury instruction claims fail.3

3

Because defendant's claims raise no errors by the trial court, the State does not
address defendant's claim in Point IV that "the errors were prejudicial." Aplt. Br. at 36
(capitalization omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.
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ADDENDUM A

76-6-101. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal
property which is capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a
habitable structure.
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway
car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or
conducting business whether a person is actually present or not.
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a
possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof.
(4) "Value" means:
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the
time and place of the offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the
market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of
repairing or replacing the property within a reasonable time following
the offense.
(5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained by
the criteria set forth in Subsections (a) and (b) above, the property shall be
deemed to have a value less than $300.

76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(DA person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily iiyury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.

76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

